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ONE TIER BEYOND RAMAPO: OPEN SPACE
ZONING AND THE URBAN RESERVE*
Using a proposal prepared for the City of San Diego as a
mode, the writer discusses growth management control of urban
fringe land. Particular attention is given to the taking issue
presented by the effort to delay development on the outskirts of a
cityfor many years. Modification of existing legislation is recom-
mended to clarify California's open space provisions and tofacil-
itate the use of open space zoning to guide urban growth. The
discussion concludes with a commentary on the daring new ap-
proaches two courts have recently taken which tend to establish a
middle ground between non-compensable regulation under the
police power and just compensation under the power of eminent
domain.
Our cities are growing. Year after year people migrate to urban
metropolitan areas. In some instances, the resultant need for
housing is critical.' The logical response to increased demand for
housing is accelerated residential building. Unfortunately, how-
ever, the solution to one problem soon creates another. Open
space on the urban fringe rapidly dwindles as housing shrouds
the land.
The challenge of managing urban growth while simultaneously
preserving open space can be met only through careful planning.
Such planning can be divided into two categories: planning for the
permanent preservation of open space for parks and other long
term uses, and planning for the temporary preservation of open
space which is a byproduct of the successful management of ur-
ban growth. The first type of open space preservation has been
discussed at length elsewhere.2 This Comment explores the sec-
ond.
* The author wishes to express her sincere gratitude to Professor John
Winters, Professor Paul Horton, and Associate Dean Herbert Lazerow for their
guidance and assistance in the preparation of this Comment.
1. L.A. Times, Mar. 5, 1978, § 8, at 1, coL 1.
2. See, e.g., Eveleth, An Appraisal of Techniques to Preserve Open Space, 9
ViLL. L. Rnv. 559 (1964); Roe, Innovative Techniques to Preserve Rural Land
Resources, 5 ENVT'L AFF. 419 (1976); Yannacone, Agricultural Lands, Fertile Soils,
Popular Sovereignty, the Trust Doctrine, Environmental Impact Assessment and
the Natural Law, 51 N.D. L REV. 615 (1975); Comment, Development Rights Trans-
fer in Livermore: A Planning Strategy to Conserve Open Space, 5 GOLDEN GATE L,
REv. 191 (1975).
August 1978 Vol. 15 No, 5
1211
Several states, including California, have recognized the impor-
tance of preserving open space. To that end the California legisla-
ture has enacted many statutes fostering open space preservation
at the local level.3 These statutory provisions can be coordinated
with local zoning ordinances to enhance the effective control a
city can exercise over residential growth. One very resourceful
scheme for maximizing the reach of municipal regulation of open
space land has been developed for the City of San Diego by Pro-
fessor Robert H. Freilich.4
Professor Freilich's method coordinates tax incentive programs
with zoning ordinances to increase the likelihood that courts will
sustain under the police power stringent regulations of the use of
land. The method can be employed to help prevent the premature
development of land on the outskirts of a city, an area known by
planners as the urban fringe or urban reserve.
This Comment uses the San Diego proposal as a model to ex-
amine techniques for the conservation of open space land through
the establishment of an urban reserve. Particular attention is
given to the taking issues which must be circumvented if the pro-
gram is to be successful. The writer suggests modification of the
California open space legislation and commends several new ap-
proaches taken by courts in both California and New York.5
These approaches entail the establishment of a middle way 6 be-
3. See generally CAT_ CONST. art. 13, § 8; CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 16100-16101, 16140-
16154, 16170, 51050-51065, 51070-51073, 51075, 51080-51087, 51090-97, 51200-51205, 51220,
51230-51249, 51251-51253, 51280-51285, 51290-51295, 65300-65307, 65350-65361, 65400.
65402, 65450-65452, 65500-65507, 65550-65553, 65560-65564, 65566-65568, 65570, 65700,
65800, 65803-65804, 65850-65863.5, 65910-65912 (West Supp. 1977); CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE §§ 421-424, 426-430.5 (West Supp. 1977).
4. Professor Robert H. Freilich is the Hulen Professor of Law in Urban Affairs
at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and the Director of the
Urban Legal Affairs program of the Law School He also edits The Urban Lawyer
and is Chairman of the Section of Local Government of the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools. He has been a consultant on growth controls and land use to
Kansas City, Missouri; Fairfax County, Virginia; Hollywood, Florida; Rockland
County, New York, Honolulu, Hawaii; and the Metropolitan Council, Minneapolis.
St. Paul. He is the author of a volume on national model regulations for the control
of land subdivision which was published in conjunction with the American Society
of Planning Officials. Professor Freilich is a member of both the Missouri and the
New York Bars and was a partner in a New York law firm specializing in munici-
pal and land-use law for ten years. He served as counsel for defendant in the na-
tionally prominent case of Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285
N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972), in which the
New York Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of timing and sequencing
controls in zoning. R. FREucH, A FIVE-TIERED GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
FOR SAN DIEGO i-ii (1976) [hereinafter cited as GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAMI].
5. See Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976);
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), affd, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978).
6. See generally Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Controversies:
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tween non-compensable regulation under the police power and
just compensation under the power of eminent domain.
THE FIVE-TIERED PROPOSAL FOR GROWTH MANAGEMENT CONTROL
Under the program proposed for San Diego,7 all land situated
within the boundaries of the central city is to be placed in one of
five tiers.8 Tier I is the downtown core-the heart of financial,
governmental, and entertainment activities. Tier Il includes the
older, established residential neighborhoods. Incentives are of-
fered in these two tiers to encourage the development of vacant
land and the redevelopment of land not presently utilized at max-
imum efficiency.9 A capital improvements program will be under-
taken to provide community facilities to these areas,' 0 and impact
fees will be reduced or eliminated."
Tier III embraces areas presently in a stage of active develop-
ment. Land in Tier III will be allowed to develop in three sequen-
tial phases' 2 as the city is able to provide community facilities
such as roads and sewers. Development will proceed in a staged,
contiguous fashion or, alternatively, in large development units.13
In contrast to the approach taken in Tiers I and II, the burden of
providing facilities in Tier I will be placed on the developer,
through impact fees, or on the homeowner, through special as-
sessment districts.' 4
A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1976); Costonis, "Fair" Com-
pensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in
Land Use Controversies, 75 CoLuM. L. REV. 1021 (1975); Costonis, The Disparity Is-
sue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 HARV. L. REV. 402
(1977).
7. For a discussion of the numerous issues raised by the proposed Growth Man-
agement Program, see J. Winters, An Independent Legal Analysis of "A Growth
Management Program for San Diego" (April, 1978) (Institute of Public and Urban
Affairs, San Diego State University).
8. A "tier" is a term used by planners to refer to a planning area. Separating a
city into tiers helps planners group areas of a city having similar planning require-
ments.
9. GRowTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 4, at 2-8; San Diego City Plan-
ning Department, Planning Report: Growth Management Element (Feb. 10, 1978)
(on file with the San Diego Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Planning Report].
10. Planning Report, note 9 supra.
11. Id.
12. See GRoWTH iMANAGEMENT PROGRAI(, supra note 4, at 4-15.
13. Id., at 5-1.
14. Planning Report, note 9 supra.
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Tier IV is the urban reserve: potentially developable land on the
urban fringe which will be restricted from development until
at least 1995. Tax relief will be provided for some of this land
through the Williamson' 5 and Open Space Easement16 Acts.17
The purpose of this urban reserve is to "preclude premature de-
velopment and allow urbanization to be guided."18
Tier V is an overlay tier-land carved from the other four tiers
for special protection. 19 Tier V includes parks, environmentally
sensitive land, and other open space land20 which is to be perma-
nently preserved.2' This land is to be regulated by development
controls where possible. Outright purchases will be financed by
special assessment districts.22
One of the primary objectives of the proposed San Diego
program is to discourage new development at the suburban fringe
while encouraging it at the urban core. Such redirection is
designed to help prevent leapfrog development, urban sprawl, and
concomitant decay of the downtown area.23
THE TIER BEYOND RAMAPO
The concept of using zoning to phase development so that it
coincides with a city's ability to provide community facilities first
received judicial approval in Golden v. Planning Board of
Ramapo.24 However, the San Diego proposal carries the tier sys-
tem one step beyond what the New York Court of Appeals ap-
proved in Ramapo. This additional step is the fourth tier--open
space land held in an urban reserve with no potential for subdivi-
sion-type development until at least 1995.
15. CAL. GovIT CODE §§ 51200-51205, 51220, 51230-51249, 51251-51253, 51280-51285,
51290-51295 (West Supp. 1977).
16. Id. §§ 51050-51065 (West Supp. 1977).
17. GRoWTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 4, at 4-22 to -31.
18. Planning Report, supra note 9, at 5.
19. GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 4, at 2-10 to -11.
20. The open space land designated for preservation in Tier V includes flood-
plains, extreme slopes, earthquake fault zones, geologic hazard areas, areas re-
quired for the protection of water resources and air and water quality, natural
resource areas, and areas needed to link or to protect other open space lands. Id.,
at 3-6 to -9.
21. Id., at 3-1.
22. Planning Report, note 9 supra.
23. See GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 4, at 2-1 to -2.
24. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
1003 (1972). This case has been the subject of many commentaries. See, e.g., Bos-
selman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights of the Whole
World?, 1 FLA. ST. UJ. REV. 234 (1973); Note, A Zoning Program for Phased
Growt&- Ramapo Township's Time Controls on Residential Development, 47 N.Y.U.
L Rev. 723 (1972); Note, Phased Zoning: Regulation of the Tempo and Sequence of
Land Development, 26 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1974).
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The Ramapo scheme was grounded on a three-phased plan.
Each phase involved a six-year period of development. The plan
called for sequential development of the three phases over an
eighteen-year period. A corresponding eighteen-year program for
the township's provision of community facilities was adopted.25
The town conditioned the grant of a special permit required for
the residential-development use of land on the availability of
these facilities. A point system was devised to measure the quali-
ty and kind of facilities available to particular parcels of land.26
When the township's capital improvements program reached the
subject property, the developer would receive enough points to be
granted the special permit. Alternatively, if he wished to develop
land which the capital improvements program had not yet
reached, he could himself supply enough facilities to earn the
number of points required for approval.27
In its review of the Ramapo scheme, the New York Court of Ap-
peals stressed the importance of the township's commitment to
its capital improvements program. In a footnote the court stated
that if the township defaulted, the landowner could seek relief
and could have the ordinance declared unconstitutional as ap-
plied to his property.28
The San Diego proposal resembles the Ramapo program in its
provision for phased development which is linked to the se-
quenced provision of capital improvements to Tier UI. However,
the San Diego scheme is significantly different because it lacks a
program for the provision of capital improvements to the Tier IV
urban reserve land. Furthermore, the San Diego proposal con-
tains no provision allowing the developer himself to provide serv-
ices to his Tier IV land in order to accelerate development.29
As a matter of policy, the City of San Diego is not attempting to
stop all development. Instead, the Growth Management Program
attempts to ensure "that urban growth will occur in logically de-
fined increments phased with and/or adjusted to the City's capac-
ity to accommodate growth."30 Growth which might have occurred
25. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 367, 285 N.E.2d 291, 295, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, 144, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
26. Id. at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
27. Id. at 368-69, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
28. Id. at 373 n.7, 285 N.E.2d at 298 n.7, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 148 n.7.
29. See GnowTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, .upra note 4, at 4-1 to -32.
30. Planning Report, supra note 9, at 2.
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prematurely in Tier IV is to be redirected to the other three tiers.
Theoretically, it is neither logical nor feasible to allow urban ex-
pansion into Tier IV until at least 1995.31 But the addition of this
new tier to the familiar Ramapo system must be managed with
great caution to avoid triggering the taking issue.
THE CALIFORNIA OPEN SPACE LEGISLATION
The California legislature has enacted a number of provisions
to encourage the preservation of open space at the local level.32
Each city or county is required 33 to adopt a general plan.34 The
general plan must include an open space element.35 The open
space element of the general plan, also known as the open space
plan,3 6 must include an action program37 consisting of specific
means for implementing the open space plan. All general law cit-
ies38 must also adopt an open space zoning ordinance 39 consistent
with the open space plan. Although chartered cities are not re-
quired to adopt an open space zoning ordinance,40 any regulatory
action taken in regard to open space land must be consistent with
the open space plan.4 ' Neither general law nor chartered cities
may issue building permits or approve subdivision maps unless
the proposed building or subdivision is consistent with the open
space plan. 42 General law cities or counties which have adopted a
specific plan43 for implementing their open space plans are sub-
ject to a further consistency requirement relating to the construc-
tion of streets, sewers, other connections, or public buildings.44 A
chartered city must amend its charter or adopt an ordinance to
secure the same degree of coordination. 45
The definition of open space in the Open Space Lands Act 46 is
31. GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROGRA-M, s'upra note 4, at 4-1.
32. See note 3 supra.
33. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65300 (West 1966).
34. For a detailed discussion of the general plan requirement, see Perry, The
Local "General Plan" in California, 9 SAx DIEGO L, REV. 1 (1971).
35. CAT. Gov'T CODE § 65302(e) (West Supp. 1977).
36. See id. § 65560(a).
37. Id. § 65564.
38. For a discussion of the differences between general law and chartered cities
in California, see 2 E. McQUlUiN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATONS § 4.83
(1966).
39. CAL. Gov'r CODE § 65910 (West Supp. 1977).
40. Id. § 65803 (West 1966).
41. Id. § 65566 (West Supp. 1977).
42. Id. § 65567.
43. Specific plans include all detailed regulations necessary to implement the
general plan. See Id. § 65451.
44. Id. § 65553.
45. Id. § 65700.
46. Section 65560(b) of the Open Space Lands Act provides:
1216
[voIL 15: 1211, 19781 Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
employed for the purposes of most open space legislation. This
definition is important because it limits the kinds of land which
can be included in the open space plan. 47 Once a particular parcel
of land is justifiably included in the plan, numerous other provi-
sions come into effect and assure implementation through both
the requirement for an action program48 and all the "consistency"
requirements. 49
According to the definition, open space land is land which is es-
sentially unimproved and devoted to an open space use.50 The
open space uses listed include open space used for the managed
production of resources 5' and open space for outdoor recreation,
including areas of outstanding scenic value and areas particularly
suited for park and recreation purposes. 52
Professor Freilich suggests that establishing the relationship of
urban reserve land to the open space plan is "central to support-
"Open space land" is any parcel or area of land or water which is essen-
tially unimproved and devoted to an open-space use as defined in this sec-
tion, and which is designated on a local, regional or state open-space plan
as any of the following.(1) Open space for the preservation of natural resources including, but
not limited to, areas required for the preservation of plant and animal life,
including habitat for fish and wildlife species; areas required for ecologic
and other scientific study purposes; rivers, streams, bays and estuaries;
and coastal beaches, lakeshores, banks of rivers and streams, and water-
shed lands.
(2) Open space used for the managed production of resources, in-
cluding but not limited to, forest lands, rangeland, agricultural lands and
areas of economic importance for the production of food or fiber; areas re-
quired for recharge of ground water basins; bays, estuaries, marshes, riv-
ers and streams which are important for the management of commercial
fisheries; and areas containing major mineral deposits, including those in
short supply.
(3) Open space for outdoor recreation, including but not limited to, ar-
eas of outstanding scenic, historic and cultural value; areas particularly
suited for park and recreation purposes, including access to lakes hores,
beaches, and rivers and streams; and areas which serve as links between
major recreation and open-space reservations, including utility easements,
banks of rivers and streams, trails, and scenic highway corridors.
(4) Open space for public health and safety, including, but not limited
to, areas which require special management or regulation because of haz-
ardous or special conditions such as earthquake fault zones, unstable soil
areas, flood plains, watersheds, areas presenting high fire risks, areas re-
quired for the protection of water quality and water reservoirs and areas
required for the protection and enhancement of air quality.
Id. § 65560(b).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 65564.
49. Id. §§ 65553, 65566-65567, 65910.
50. Id. § 65566(b).
51. Id. § 65560(b) (2).
52. Id. § 65560(b) (3).
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big the legal validity of land use regulations in this area." 53 He
recommends incorporating all Tier IV urban reserve land into the
open space plan. He asserts that this inclusion is justified54 be-
cause of the land's potential use for agricultural production55 or
"its importance as a mechanism to prevent premature conversion
to urban uses and to help control urban sprawl."5 6
That agricultural land can be included in the open space plan is
clear from the language of the Open Space Lands Act.57 However,
the inclusion of non-agricultural land in the open space plan is
questionable under the relevant definition. Professor Freilich as-
serts that such land can be included in the open space plan and
supports his assertion with the following legislative finding and
declaration from the Open Space Lands Act: "[D]iscouraging pre-
mature and unnecessary conversion of open-space land to urban
uses is a matter of public interest and will be of benefit to urban
dwellers because it will discourage noncontiguous development
patterns which unnecessarily increase the costs of community
services to community residents." 8 Given this finding and the
very broad definition of open space land in the Act, Professor
Freilich concludes that Tier IV land can be incorporated in the
open space plan.59 Once this incorporation is accomplished, im-
plementation of the plan is assured via the action program6O and
consistency requirements.6'
The broad definition of open space given in the Open Space
Lands Act has not yet received judicial interpretation. Some ur-
ban reserve land will be zoned for large lots allowing one dwelling
unit per five or ten acres.62 A five-acre lot with a home on it may
not qualify as being "essentially unimproved." Furthermore, land
unsuitable for agriculture may not always qualify as an area of
outstanding scenic value or as an area particularly suited for park
and recreation purposes.
If the legislature indeed intends for the open space element of
general plans to include certain open space land on a temporary
basis for the purpose of managing the location and timing of ur-
ban growth, it should so provide. Although the statement of find-
53. GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 4, at 4-1.
54. Id., at 4-5.
55. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65560(b) (2) (West Supp. 1977).
56. GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 4, at 4-5.
57. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65560(b) (2) (West Supp. 1977).
58. Id. § 65561(b).
59. GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 4, at 4-1 to -4.
60. CAT_ GOV'T CODE § 65564 (West Supp. 1977).
61. Id. §§ 65553, 65566-65567, 65910.
62. GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 4, at 4-17.
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ing and declaration does lend itself to this interpretation,63 the
definition of open space land should specifically include the pre-
vention of noncontiguous development patterns as a permissible
open space use. If the legislation stands as written, many local
governments are likely to refrain from attempts to preserve open
space because of a realistic fear of litigation.
THREE TYPES OF OPEN SPACE ZONES
Open space zoning describes any type of zoning regulation used
to preserve open space.64 Professor Freilich recommends three
specific types of zones in the San Diego urban reserve: exclusive
agricultural use zones, large lot zones, and holding zones.65 Each
type of zone adopted must be designed to withstand challenge to
its constitutionality on the ground it deprives the landowner of
his property without just compensation. 66 Because of this
threatened challenge, important considerations in employing
open space zones are: What is the land's present use? Is the land
suitable for the use permitted by the proposed zoning ordinance?
Is there a market for the land given the proposed lot size and use
limitation? These questions are frequently discussed by the
courts in considering the validity of zoning ordinances as applied
to particular parcels of land. Because zoning cases often turn on
the factual context in which a zone is employed, this context
should be examined and compared to the context of an urban re-
serve.
Exclusive Agricultural Use Zones
California courts have upheld exclusive use zones in numerous
situations,67 three of which involved exclusive agricultural use
zones.68 An exclusive agricultural use zone usually imposes two
63. See CAL Gov'T CODE § 65561 (West Supp. 1977).
64. See id. §§ 65560, 65910.
65. GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 4, at 4-9 to -21.
66. See, e.g., Gisler v. County of Madera, 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919
(1974).
67. See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515,
370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962); McCarthy v.
City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953), cert, denied, 348 U.S.
817 (1954); Mang v. County of Santa Barbara, 182 Cal. App. 2d 93, 5 Cal. Rptr. 724
(1960); Roney v. Board of Supervisors, 138 Cal. App. 2d 740, 292 P.2d 529 (1956).
68. Gisler v. County of Madera, 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974); Par-
amount Rock Co. v. County of San Diego, 180 Cal. App. 2d 217, 4 Cal. Rptr. 317
(1960); Sladovich v. County of Fresno, 158 Cal. App. 2d 230, 322 P.2d 565 (1958).
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kinds of restrictions: minimum lot size and use limitation. The
permitted uses are agriculture and uses normally deemed com-
patible with agriculture, such as a single-family dwelling.69
Minimum lot sizes for exclusive agricultural use zones have
ranged as high as one hundred acres in California,7 0 but appar-
ently such restrictions have gone unchallenged in the courts.71
However, a minimum lot size of eighteen acres was upheld in
Gisler v. County of Madera72 against a claim of inverse condem-
nation.
In Gisler, a 1913 subdivision plat authorized two and one-half-
acre parcels for the subject property.73 Nonetheless, no funds had
been expended toward construction of the subdivision by the
time of trial, and all the property was devoted exclusively to agri-
cultural uses.74 In upholding the eighteen-acre lot size in the ex-
clusive agricultural use zone which was imposed in 1965, the
California Supreme Court emphasized the legislative policy favor-
ing the preservation of open space and agricultural land.75 It also
stressed the fact that the current use was an agricultural one.76
Two California appellate cases involving exclusive agricultural
uses are Sladovich v. County of Fresno77 and Paramount Rock
Co. v. County of San Diego.78 The Sladovich court upheld the
zoning of land for rural residential and agricultural uses even
though it was partly surrounded by industrial zones, 79 but the
land was already being used for residential and agricultural uses.
In Paramount Rock, the court upheld the prohibition of a rock-
crushing plant in an agricultural zone.8 0 The court noted that an
attempt had been made at one time to use the subject property
for farming, but it was not suited for such a use. However, the
court added that "lands similarly situated in the river bed have
been used for 'golf courses, dairies, riding stables, cattle grazing,
etc."' 81 Apparently, therefore, the land was suited to numerous
other uses compatible with agriculture.
69. F. BROADHEAD & R. ROSENFELD, OPEN SPACE ZONING HANDBOOK 104-06
(1973).
70. GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 4, at 4-11.
71. Id.; but see Sanfilippo v. County of Santa Cruz, 415 F. Supp. 1340 (N.D. Cal.
1976).
72. 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974).
73. Id. at 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 307-08, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
76. Id.
77. 158 Cal. App. 2d 230, 322 P.2d 565 (1958).
78. 180 CaL App. 2d 217, 4 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1960).
79. 158 Cal. App. 2d at 239-40, 322 P.2d at 570-71.
80. 180 Cal. App. 2d at 217, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
81. Id. at 223, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
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The problem with employing the exclusive agricultural use
zone as a device to preserve open space is that it is very restric-
tive. Generally, large parcel sizes are required to encourage farm-
ing efficiency.8 2 Unless farming is a reasonable use of the
property, a very large parcel size coupled with an exclusive agri-
cultural use restriction might be considered a taking.8 3
Furthermore, even if farming is a reasonable use of the prop-
erty, the large parcel size may by itself present taking problems.
Consider the impact that property taxes have in the following hy-
pothetical. Several thousand acres of land on the outskirts of a
city have been zoned for a sixty-acre minimum parcel size and ex-
clusive agricultural use. Directly across a bordering interstate
freeway, subdivision development on quarter-acre lots is occur-
ring. As a result, the market value of the farm land rises because
the buyers predict that the city will rezone the farm land to allow
development. The tax assessor bases his assessment of the farm
property on its fair market value regardless of the zoning restric-
tions.84 He is required to do this by law.8 5 Soon thereafter prop-
erty taxes on the land outstrip the economic return the farmer is
receiving from his use of the land. Yet the existing zoning restric-
tion does not allow him any use of the land which will pay his
property taxes. Arguably, the farmer's land has been taken with-
out just compensation. 86
Large Lot Zones
The second type of open space zone is the large lot zone. Pro-
fessor Freilich recommends large lot zones allowing one residen-
tial unit per five- or ten-acre lot.87 A five-acre lot size is preferable
to a one- or two-acre size because the smaller lot size allows too
much urbanization to occur. Smaller lot sizes necessitate major
82. F. BROADHEAD & R. ROSENFELD, OPEN SPACE ZONING HANDBOOK 104 (1973).
83. Id.
84. Zoning is not considered an enforceable restriction within the meaning of
art. XII, § 8 of the California Constitution. CAL REV. & TAX. CODE § 422 (West
Supp. 1977).
85. Guild Wineries and Distilleries v. Fresno County, 51 Cal. App. 3d 182, 187,
124 Cal. Rptr. 96, 99 (1975); CAI. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 110, 110.5, 401 (West Supp.
1977).
86. F. BROADHEAD & R. ROSENFELD, OPEN SPACE ZONING HANDBOOK 107 (1973).
See also Brown v. City of Fremont, 75 Cal. App. 3d 141, 145, 142 Cal. Rptr. 46, 48-49
(1977).
87. GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROGRA1S, supra note 4, at 4-17.
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streets, roads, schools, and other community facilities; 88 control of
the need for these services is one of the main objectives of estab-
lishing the urban reserve in the first place. 89
A large lot size is therefore desirable. However, the larger the
lot-size requirement is, the more stringent the regulation. If no
market for residential land in five- or ten-acre lots exists, the
landowner can argue that he has no reasonably beneficial use of
his property and that the regulation amounts to a taking.90
Scant authority exists regarding restrictions on minimum lot
size although the use of such restrictions is widespread. In Clem-
ons v. City of Los Angeles,91 the California Supreme Court recog-
nized the validity of an ordinance "limiting the subdivision of
property to certain minimum lot requirements."92 In Morse v.
County of San Luis Obispo,93 a California appellate court sus-
tained the downzoning94 of plaintiff's property from a classifica-
tion requiring one acre per dwelling to one requiring five acres.95
The court stated that individuals are not entitled to reimburse-
ment for losses resulting from police power regulations such as
zoning 96 and that "some uncompensated hardships must be
borne by individuals as the price of living in a modern enlight-
ened and progressive community."97
The Morse court upheld a five-acre lot size. The Gisler court 98
upheld an eighteen-acre lot size. However, these cases should be
distinguished factually. In Gisler, both the subject property and
the property surrounding it were devoted exclusively to agricul-
ture.99 The Morse property was surrounded by small farms, but it
was additionally subject to development pressure because it was
located four miles from a city and one mile from an airport.oo
88. Id., at 4-18.
89. Id., at 1-5.
90. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 80 Cal. App. 3d 225, 233-36, 145 Cal. Rptr. 476,
479-82 (1978); Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 628, 129 Cal. Rptr.
575, 584 (1976).
91. 36 Cal. 2d 95, 222 P.2d 439 (1950).
92. Id. at 97, 222 P.2d at 442.
93. 247 Cal. App. 2d 600, 55 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1967).
94. To "downzone" a parcel of property means to rezone it so that the overall
density potential of the parcel is decreased.
95. The case sounded in inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs had purchased the
property with the expectation of getting subdivision approval; however, not only
was their request for "upzoning" denied, but the property was "downzoned" in-
stead.
96. 247 Cal. App. 2d at 603, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
97. Id.
98. Gisler v. County of Madera, 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974). See
text accompanying notes 72-76 supra.
99. Id. at 305, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
100. 247 Cal. App. 2d at 601, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
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Among the California cases, Morse apparently involves the larg-
est lot size upheld for property subject to development pressure.
Significantly, this property was suitable for agriculture as well as
for homesites. The holding in Morse may thus be limited to its
facts.
If the validity of Professor Freilich's recommendation of a five-
acre large lot zone for the urban reserve is doubtful, the validity
of his alternate recommendation is even more doubtful. Two Cali-
fornia courts have frowned on open space zones with a ten-acre
minimum lot size.1O' Both cases involved a Palo Alto ordinance
restricting land in the foothills. In Dahl v. City of Palo Alto,102 the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of California held
that the landowner's complaint for inverse condemnation stated a
claim upon which relief could be granted.103 However, in its sum-
mary of the facts, the court gave much more emphasis to the
precondemnation activities' 0 4 in which the City of Palo Alto had
engaged than to the ten-acre lot size.l05 In Eldridge v. City of Palo
101. See Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Eldridge v.
City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976). A third California
decision involving the same Palo Alto ordinance, Arastra Ltd. v. City of Palo Alto,
401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated, 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976), held
that the open space ordinance amounted to a taking. The court stated that it did
not consider the ordinance to be standing alone and emphasized the importance of
the city's precondemnation activities.
In a decision reached after this Comment went to press, a California appellate
court held that an open space zoning ordinance with a five-acre minimum lot size
did not violate the legislative intent of the state open space statutes. Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 80 Cal. App. 3d 255, 232, 145 Cal. Rptr. 476, 479 (1978). Interestingly, the
plaintiff had argued that the restrictions on its property were not stringent
enough. However, with respect to a separate cause of action for inverse condemna-
tion, the court reversed a judgment of dismissal on demurrer without leave to
amend. Quoting Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 628, 129 Cal. Rptr.
575, 583 (1976), the court stressed that "[wihether a zoning restriction is so 'arbi-
trary,' or 'unreasonable,' or 'burdensome,' as to transcend 'proper bounds in its in-
vasion of property rights,' is ordinarily a question offact to be determined by trial
of the issue, and not by demurrer."' Agins v. City of Tiburon, 80 Cal. App. 3d 225,
233, 145 Cal. Rptr. 476, 479 (1978) (emphasis original). Plaintiff Agins had alleged
both significant precondemnation activities and the lack of any reasonable re-
maining use.
102. 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
103. Id. at 648-49.
104. The City of Palo Alto intended to condemn the property for a public park,
but it was unable to finance the acquisition. Only after the city's attempts at ob-
taining the necessary financing proved fruitless were the open space zoning re-
strictions imposed.
105. 372 F. Supp. at 648.
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Alto,106 however, a California appellate court stated that one of
the factual issues to be resolved when the matter went to trial
was "whether the 10-acre homesites [were] saleable at all." 0 7
Thus, the Eldridge court gave substantial weight to lot size in its
decision.
Although the outcome of the two Palo Alto decisions casts
doubt on the validity of a ten-acre lot size in an open space zoning
ordinance-particularly if the lot size renders the restricted prop-
erty unmarketable-such an ordinance in an urban reserve is dis-
tinguishable. In the first place, the Palo Alto decisions rested
heavily on the city's precondemnation activities.108 Second, the
Palo Alto restrictions were intended to be permanent. The large
lot zones in an urban reserve are not. Instead, their purpose is to
delay high-density development until the city has the capacity to
extend its services to the urban reserve land. Third, the Palo Alto
plan called for a "paths and trials system" across the subject
property to allow "public access through the Foothill lands."109
This system of paths arguably constitutes a "public use" requir-
ing compensation. An urban reserve requires no such system.
Another difficulty with large lot zones is that they may be con-
sidered exclusionary." 0 If the overall community plan does not al-
low for higher-density uses to accommodate low-income families,
the urban reserve becomes subject to this form of challenge."'
Provisions for low-income housing and multi-family developments
should be included in the other sections of the city to protect the
validity of the regulations in the urban reserve and in the overall
plan." 2
Large lot zones have an important place in the urban reserve.
They prevent undue urbanization of land which cannot be placed
in an exclusive agricultural use zone because it is not suitable for
agriculture. Caution must be exercised, however, not to make the
lot size so large that the homesites become unmarketable." 3 Con-
106. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
107. Id. at 628, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
108. See Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Eldridge v.
City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
109. Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 628, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
110. See generally R. BABcoCK, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING (1973); Rose, Exclusion-
ary Zoning and Managed Growth: Some Unresolved Issues, 6 RuT.-CA . LJ. 689
(1975); Annot., 48 A.R.3d 1210 (1973).
111. Gnowrn MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 4, at 4-17.
112. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 NJ.
151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). But see also
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
113. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 80 Cal. App. 3d 225, 237, 145 Cal. Rptr. 476, 479
(1978); Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 628, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575, 584
(1976).
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trary to the recommendations of Professor Frelich, the lot size
should be kept to less than five acres1 4 for non-agricultural land.
The parcel size can be larger, however, if the land is suited for ag-
ricultural as well as for residential use.115
Holding Zones
The holding zone is the third type of open space zone suggested
for the urban reserve. The holding zone is a "wait and see" zoning
method 16 by which land is designated for a particular use with
the expectation that the designation will be changed in time. Fre-
quently the designation is "agricultural" or "rural residential."
When the area in question develops a sufficient trend toward a
particular high-density use-such as urban-residential, commer-
cial, or industrial-the zoning is changed." 7
The holding zone is sometimes referred to as an unclassified, or
"U" zone. Two California cases specifically uphold this type of
zone: National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey118 and Cas-
tiglione v. County of San Diego." 9 The National Advertising
court struck down an ordinance requiring the removal of off-site
signs not yet amortized in "U" districts, but it upheld an ordi-
nance prohibiting construction of off-site signs in the same dis-
tricts. 2 0 The court reasoned that the "U" districts were designed
as holding zones "whose rural character was to be maintained
only until some definite trend toward particular uses began to de-
velop"121 and that it was likely that some of the districts would
develop into zones in which off-site signs would be permitted.
Therefore the remedy of removal was refused because it was not
clear that such a remedy either was, or would become, neces-
sary.122
114. A three-acre minimum lot size apparently was assumed valid by the par-
ties in Pratt v. Adams, 229 Cal. App. 2d 602, 40 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
115. Compare Gisler v. County of Madera, 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919
(1974), with Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal. App. 2d 600, 55 Cal. Rptr.
710 (1967).
116. 1 MANAGEMENT & CoNTRoL OF GROWTH 27 (. Scott ed. 1975).
117. See National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 1 Cal. 3d 875, 878, 464
P.2d 33, 34, 83 Cal. Rptr. 577, 578, appeal dismissed, 398 U.S. 946 (1970).
118. Id.
119. 15 Cal. App. 3d 880, 93 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1971).
120. 1 Cal. 3d at 879-81, 464 P.2d at 35-36, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80.
121. Id. at 878, 464 P.2d at 34, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
122. Id.
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The holding in National Advertising suggests that the city may
not have as much regulatory control in holding zones as it would
have in the other kinds of zones. Although the city could prohibit
an undesirable use, it might encounter judicial resistance to erad-
icating a use existing prior to the imposition of the holding zone.
The Castiglione court upheld a "U" zone in the unincorporated
territory of San Diego County. 23 Thus both courts upheld holding
zones in areas which were rural in nature. The use of a holding
zone within the boundaries of a central city may be questionable.
Professor Freilich recommends the use of holding zones in Tier
IV urban reserve areas contiguous to Tier II areas where devel-
opment is permitted. The holding zones are to be applied to those
areas which might be shifted to Tier TTT and allowed to develop af-
ter the first five years of the Growth Management Program. 24
Professor Freilich recommends that the ordinance allow for "agri-
culture and other open space uses as of right [and] for other non-
agricultural uses by conditional use permit with specific stand-
ards required."125 The zoning would be changed when the com-
munity facilities had been extended to these areas.
Although the cases specifically upholding "U" zones involved
rural land, it is possible that the courts would also uphold the use
of the zones on the outskirts of a city. Arguably, holding zones fall
within the rationale of Ramapo.126 The restrictions involved are
of much shorter duration than those involved in the other kinds of
open space zones. Furthermore, development of land in the hold-
ing zones is conditioned on the ability of the city to supply com-
munity facilities. The zoning will be changed as soon as the
capital improvements program extends to the subject property.
TAX INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
California has two prograns designed to reduce property taxes
on open space and agricultural land: the Williamson Act127 and
the Open Space Easement Act.128 Professor Freilich has sug-
gested a carefully coordinated employment of the two programs
in conjunction with open space zoning. If property taxes are re-
duced on land in the urban reserve, it is less likely that the open
space ordinances will be deemed a taking by the courts. The rea-
123. 15 Cal. App. 3d 880, 93 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1971).
124. GROWTH MANAGEmENT PROGRAM, supra note 4, at 4-15.
125. Id., at 4-17.
126. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
127. CAT. GOV'T CODE 51200-51205, 51220, 51230-51249, 51251-51254, 51280-51285,
51290-51295 (West Supp. 1977).
128. Id. §§ 51050-51065, 51070-51073, 51075, 51080-51087, 51090-51097.
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son is that a landowner whose property taxes rise above the re-
turn he receives from his land has a strong argument that his
property has been taken without compensation.129 Conversely,
the lower the landowner's property taxes are, the more stringent
the zoning restrictions can be before they amount to a taking.
The Williamson Act
One of the most interesting and innovative suggestions made
by Professor Freilich is his method for securing tax relief for non-
agricultural urban reserve land under the Williamson Act.13o This
Act was adopted to encourage the preservation of agricultural,
open space,131 and other environmentally sensitive or economi-
cally important land through tax relief.132 The Act provides for the
city or county to designate an agricultural preserve, usually con-
sisting of a minimum of one hundred acres.133 Any landowner
whose land is in the preserve may enter into a contract with the
city or county. 3 4 This contract restricts the landowner's use of his
land to agriculture. Significantly, however, he may also use it for
any use designated compatible by the city council or the county
board of supervisors.135
The power to designate compatible uses gives the city or county
the opportunity to make non-agricultural land eligible for tax re-
duction benefits. Non-agricultural land can be included in the pre-
serve if it is devoted to recreational use136 or open space use. 3 7
The definitions of these two uses for the purpose of including
land in the preserve are very broad. 3 8 Thus, the Williamson Act
can be used to offer property tax reduction for all land in the ur-
ban reserve.
Land under a Williamson Act contract is deemed to be "en-
129. See F. BROADHEAD & I. ROSENFELD, OPEN SPACE ZONING HANDBOOK 107
(1973).
130. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-51205, 51220, 51230-51249, 51251-51253, 51280-51285,
51290-51295 (West Supp. 1977).
131. K. BROWN, P. DORAN, W. MCCLURE, N. SOLOMON, & J. TARvER, THE PROPER-
TY TAx AND PRESERVATION OF OPEN SPACE LAND IN CALIFORNIA: A STUDY OF THE
WL AmSON ACT 9-10 (1974).
132. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51202 (West Supp. 1977).
133. Id. § 51220.
134. Id. §§ 51240-51249, 51251-51253.
135. Id. §§ 51238, 51243(a).
136. Id. §§ 15201(d), 51205.
137. Id.
138. Id. § 15201(n),(o).
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forceably restricted." 39 Under the California Constitution40 such
land must be valued for the purposes of property taxes "on a ba-
sis that is consistent with its restrictions and uses."141 The factors
to be considered in assessing restricted land are set forth in the
Revenue and Taxation Code.142 The tax assessor is required to
use the capitalization-of-income method of valuation, which re-
sults in the land's being taxed at a percentage of the income it
generates as enforceably restricted, rather than at a percentage of
its fair market value. 143 If the land is in an area experiencing de-
velopment pressure, the fair market value may be inflated due to
anticipated development.
Professor Freilich suggests that the agricultural preserve desig-
nated by the city should be coextensive with the land in the ur-
ban reserve zoned for exclusive agricultural use. 44 Part of this
land is non-agricultural land suitable for a use compatible with
agriculture. 45 This non-agricultural open space land can be in-
cluded in the preserve under the terms of the Williamson Act.146
The implementation of the zoning ordinance limiting the agricul-
tural preserve land to exclusive agricultural use or compatible
uses then becomes very significant: The landowner is prevented
from developing his land in any case. Because zoning is not an
enforceable restriction for tax assessment purposes,147 the land
will still be taxed at fair market value. However, the availability of
preferential tax assessment through Williamson Act contracts will
reduce the persuasiveness of the landowner's taking issue argu-
ment. 48 Professor Freilich contends that large blocks of land can
be systematically controlled in this manner.149
The Open Space Easement Act of 1974
The Open Space Easement Act of 1974 provides the other tax
reduction program that can be employed in the urban reserve.
This Act allows a landowner who owns open space land' 50 to
139. Id. § 51252.
140. CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 8.
141. Id.
142. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 423 (West 1970).
143. See Comment, The California Open-Space Easement Act" The Efficacy of
Indirect Incentives, 16 SANTA CLARA L REV. 359, 369 (1976).
144. GnowTH MANAGEMENT PROGRA d supra note 4, at 4-22.
145. Id., at 4-23.
146. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 51230-51239 (West Supp. 1977).
147. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 422 (West Supp. 1977).
148. GRowTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 4, at 4-27.
149. Id., at 4-25.
150. The Open Space Easement Act of 1974 uses the definition of open space
land found in CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65560 (West Supp. 1977). See note 46 supra.
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grant an easement in perpetuity'5' or for a term of not less than
ten years 5 2 to the city or county in which the land is located, so
long as that city or county has adopted an open space plan.153
Land subject to an open space easement is deemed "enforceably
restricted" 54 in the same way as is land under a Williamson Act
contract, and it receives the same special method of valuation for
property tax purposes.155
The city should offer to accept open space easements on land in
both the large lot zones and the holding zones. The easement may
contain whatever conditions, covenants, or restrictions are impor-
tant to maintaining the open character of the land.l5 6 The use of
open space easements should be an effective means of reducing
taxes in the urban reserve if the zoning imposes the same restric-
tions as does the easement. Having no opportunity to develop
their property to a high density, landowners should be willing to
grant easements, just as they should be willing to enter into Wil-
liamson Act contracts.
The only exception to this general willingness might occur
among landowners of property in the holding zones. Because the
overall plan calls for some of the land in these zones to be shifted
into Tier HI and allowed to develop after the first five years of the
Growth Management Program, 5 7 the landowners may prefer to
gamble that their land will be that allowed to shift. Therefore they
may not be willing to grant open space easements, preferring to
wait in hopes of large profits from development at a later date.
The Open Space Subventions Act
A city or a county planning to offer open space easements or
Williamson Act contracts in the urban reserve will probably need
to evaluate the potential loss in revenue from these programs.'5 8
Although the state reimburses some revenue loss to local govern-
ments under the Subventions Act,15 9 loss resulting from accepting
open space easements is specifically excepted. This lack of a state
151. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51075(d) (West Supp. 1977).
152. Id. § 51081.
153. Id. § 51080.
154. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 422 (West 1970).
155. See text accompanying notes 139-43 supra.
156. CAl. Gov'T CODE § 51082 (West Supp. 1977).
157. GRowT MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 4, at 4-15.
158. Id., at 4-29.
159. CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 16100-16101, 16140-16154 (West Supp. 1977).
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program for reimbursement of revenue funds due to the accept.
ance of open space easements is a major impediment to their suc-
cessful use in an urban reserve planning program. In recognition
of the importance of preserving open space and managing urban
growth, the state legislature should repeal the provision in the
Subventions Act excepting open space easements from its cover-
age.16o
Tax reduction programs can be used effectively in the urban re-
serve. When the acceptance of Williamson Act contracts and open
space easements is coordinated with the imposition of open space
zoning, urban growth can be managed more effectively than if the
zoning is imposed separately. The reduction in property taxes re-
sulting from the use of the Williamson or Open Space Easement
Acts should help circumvent challenges based on the taking is-
sue.
THE TAKING IssuE
The California Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property
may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compen-
sation .. .has first been paid to ... the owner."1 61 The four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that no state shall "deprive any person of ... property, without
due process of law."162 The fifth amendment, which applies to the
federal government and to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, adds: "nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." 63 These constitutional provi-
sions are the source of the taking issue inherent in the establish-
ment of an urban reserve through zoning.
Zoning ordinances, when valid, are an exercise of the police
power. 6 4 To be held a valid exercise of the police power, a zoning
ordinance must be reasonably necessary to promote public
health, safety, and general welfare.165 A strong presumption of va-
lidity exists in favor of police power regulations.166 However, as
160. Id. § 16141.
161. CAT_. CONST. art. 1, § 14.
162. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
163. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
164. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 487, 234 P. 381, 385 (1925), appeal
dismissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1926). See also Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE IJ. 36 (1964); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE LJ.
149 (1971); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for In-
verse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAT- L REV. 1 (1971).
165. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 487, 234 P. 381, 384 (1925), appeal
dismissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1926).
166. Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 497, 234 P. 388 (1925), aftd, 274 U.S.
325 (1927). See also Comment, The General Public Interest vs. The Presumption of
Zoning'Ordinance Validity: A Debatable Question, 50 J. URn. L. 129 (1972).
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Justice Holmes formulated the general rule in the landmark case
of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,167 "while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking."168
Traditionally, the plaintiff desiring to challenge the zoning of
his property has had two approaches available: (1) He could bring
a suit for inverse condemnation, praying for money damages; or
(2) he could challenge the validity of the ordinance as an exercise
of the police power, seeking to have it held unconstitutional.169
Inverse Condemnation
Few plaintiffs actually recover under a theory of inverse con-
demnation in regard to a zoning ordinance. However, in holding
for the defendants, the courts regularly recognize that a regula-
tion which goes too far will amount to a taking.170
The court in Pinheiro v. County of Matin,171 a recent case in-
volving open space zoning, reiterated the requirements for suc-
cessfully stating a cause of action in inverse condemnation. One
of three things must be effectively alleged: "precondemnation
activities, the lack of any remaining reasonably beneficial use, or
any public use"172 of the subject property. With only a few excep-
tions, all California cases in which the plaintiffs have recovered
are of the "precondemnation activity"173 type.174 One exception,
Sneed v. County of Riverside, involved actual public use of air-
space.175 In a more recent exception, San Diego Gas & Electric
Co. v. City of San Diego,176 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
affirmed a trial court decision awarding damages for inverse con-
167. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
168. Id. at 415.
169. See Pinheiro v. County of Marn, 60 Cal. App. 3d 323, 326-27 nn.2 & 3, 131
Cal. Rptr. 633, 635 nn.2 & 3 (1976).
170. See, e.g., Gisler v. County of Madera, 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919
(1974). But see San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 81 Cal App. 3d 844,
146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1978).
171. 60 Cal. App. 3d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
172. Id. at 328, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 636 (emphasis original).
173. For a discussion of precondemnation activities, see HFH, Ltd. v. Superior
Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 517 n.14, 542 P.2d 237, 243 n.14, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 371 n.14
(1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
174. Pinheiro v. County of Mar/n, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 327 n.3, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 635
n.3.
175. 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963).
176. 81 Cal. App. 3d 844, 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1978). The San Diego Gas & Electric
decision, published while this Comment was at press, is highly significant.
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demnation to a plaintiff company that had been deprived, through
the imposition of open space and other zoning regulations, of all
beneficial use of its land. However, the court based its finding at
least in part on the existence of precondemnation activities. Thus
although the courts frequently acknowledge the landowner's right
to a reasonably beneficial use of his property, no appellate-level
California court has upheld an award of damages to the plaintiff
solely because the remaining use of his property was not reason-
ably beneficial.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[tj here is no
set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking be-
gins."-77 In California, although several cases indicate the extent
to which zoning regulations may diminish the value of the re-
stricted property without being held a taking,178 no case precisely
defines where "regulation" ends and "taking begins" in terms of
the remaining value of the property. The court in HFH, Ltd. v. Su-
pefior Court179 refused to find that the downzoning of property
originally purchased for $388,000 and valued at $75,000 after the re-
zoning constituted inverse condemnation. The HFH court stated
that "a zoning action which merely decreases the market value of
property does not violate the constitutional provisions forbidding
uncompensated taking or damaging."18o
Sneed v. County of Riverside'8' clarifies the distinction made by
the courts between a diminution of value through regulation,
which is not compensable, and a taking for a public use: "When
private property rights are actually destroyed through the govern-
mental action, then police power rules are usually applica-
ble.... But, when private property rights are taken from the
individual and are conferred upon the public for public use, emi-
nent domain principles are applicable."' 82 Thus the value of prop-
erty may be diminished through downzoning until it is almost
zero. So long as the land is marketable at a use compatible with
the zoning, the regulating authority will have strong support for
its argument that the landowner has been left with a reasonably
beneficial use.183
The inverse condemnation cases of the "precondemnation activ-
177. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
178. See, e.g., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425 US. 904 (1976).
179. Id. at 508, 542 P.2d at 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
180. Id. at 518, 542 P.2d at 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
181. 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963).
182. Id. at 211, 32 Cal. Rptr: at 321.
183. See Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 628, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575,
584 (1976).
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ity" type 8 4 shared two important characteristics. First, the city or
county involved expressed its intention to acquire the subject
property through the power of eminent domain. Second, the city
or county either unreasonably delayed the commencement of em-
inent domain proceedings, or it renounced its intent altogether.185
A physical invasion of plaintiff's airspace characterized Sneed,
the public use case.186
In establishing an urban reserve, the city should avoid the sem-
blance of any condemnation-type activity. Furthermore, the urban
reserve regulations should not allow any public use of the prop-
erty. If these pitfalls are avoided, it is most likely that landowners
would bring any inverse condemnation suits on the theory that
they were left with no reasonably beneficial use. Although this
theory is recognized by the courts, it will be extremely difficult
for a plaintiff to recover damages on this basis alone.
Particular care must be taken when applying the various types
of open space zones discussed in this Comment. Land unsuitable
for agricultural use should not be so zoned unless it is clearly
suited to a designated compatible use. The compatible use must
give the landowner enough return from his land to do more than
pay his taxes. 187 The minimum lot size in the large lot zones
should be kept small enough so that the lots are marketable as
homesites. If no market exists for such lots, the landowner can ar-
gue forcefully that he has no reasonably beneficial use from his
property.188
Challenging the Validity of the Ordinance
The second approach an aggrieved landowner may take against
a zoning ordinance is to ask the court to declare the ordinance in-
valid or unconstitutional.189 To be a valid exercise of the police
184. For a discussion of precondemnation activities, see HFH, Ltd. v. Superior
Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 517 n.14, 542 P.2d 237, 243 n.14, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 371 n.14
(1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
185. See discussion in id.
186. 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963).
187. See Arastra Ltd. v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962, 975-76 (N.D. Cal.
1975), vacated, 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
188. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 80 Cal. App. 3d 225, 233-36, 145 Cal. Rptr. 476,
479-82 (1978); Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 618-19, 129 Cal. Rptr.
575, 578 (1976).
189. For a discussion of the procedural methods used with this kind of chal-
lenge, see Pinheiro v. County of Matin, 60 Cal. App. 3d 323, 327 n.3, 131 Cal. Rptr.
633, 635 n.3 (1976).
1233
power, a zoning ordinance must be reasonably necessary for the
public health, safety, and general welfare.190 The "police power"
concept has never been defined in a generally accepted way.191
However, the United States Supreme Court has stated: "'Police
power' connotes the time-tested conceptional limit of public en-
croachment upon private interests. Except for the substitution of
the familiar standard of 'reasonableness,' this Court has generally
refrained from announcing any specific criteria.' 92
In Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo,193 the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the validity of the phased-development regulations. The
New York Court of Appeals upheld the controls as "not violative
of the Federal and State Constitutions.'19 As noted earlier,195 two
significant differences exist between the growth management
schemes for Ramapo and for San Diego. First, the San Diego
scheme has no program for the city to provide capital improve-
ments to urban reserve land. Secondly, the San Diego plan has no
provision enabling a landowner to accelerate the development of
his urban reserve property by providing the improvements him-
self. However, the underlying rationale of both schemes is the
same: Development is conditioned on the availability of specified
services and facilities.
The difference between the restrictions in the Ramapo scheme
and those in the San Diego urban reserve is a difference not of
quality, but of duration. The Ramapo court addressed this ques-
tion, but in an inconclusive manner. The court stated:
An ordinance which seeks to permanently restrict the use of property
so that it may not be used for any reasonable purpose must be recognized
as a taking- The only difference between the restriction and an outright
taking in such a case "is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to
the burden of payment of taxation while outright confiscation would re-
lieve him of that burden"...... An appreciably different situation obtains
where the restriction constitutes a temporary restriction, promising that
the property may be put to a profitable use within a reasonable time. The
hardship of holding unproductive property for some time might be com-
pensated for by the ultimate benefit inuring to the individual owner in the
form of a substantial increase in valuation; or, for that matter, the land-
owner, might be compelled to chafe under the temporary restriction, with-
out the benefit of such compensation, when that burden serves to promote
the public good .... 196
190. Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 459, 327 P.2d 10, 14
(1958).
191. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
192. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
193. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
1003 (1972).
194. Id. at 383, 285 N.E.2d at 305, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
195. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
196. 30 N.Y.2d at 380-81, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154 (quoting Arverne
Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 232, 15 N.E.2d 587, 592 (1938)).
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The Ramapo court raised more questions in regard to the dura-
tion of restrictions than it answered. It left the construction of
elusive phrases such as "any reasonable purpose," "temporary re-
striction," and "reasonable time" to other courts. As the Ramapo
court very correctly foresaw, "[t]he answer which Ramapo has
posed can by no means be termed definitive; it is, however, a first
practical step toward controlled growth achieved without forsak-
ing broader social purposes."197 Both the courts and the legisla-
ture must look for new approaches, compromise solutions giving
fair treatment to landowners without abandoning important com-
munity goals. A few steps, hesitant and daring, have been taken
in this direction.
New Solutions from the Courts
Two recent decisions, one in California' 98 and one in New
York,199 present novel resolutions of related conflicts. When ex-
amined together, these two decisions suggest the viability of es-
tablishing a middle way between non-compensable regulation
under the police power and just compensation for the highest and
best use of property under the power of eminent domain.
In Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto,200 a California appellate court
rejected the traditional remedy of invalidating a zoning ordinance
so strictly regulating land that it amounted to a taking. Instead,
the court held that a regulation could be concededly valid, yet
nonetheless require compensation.
The Eldridge case involved open space ordinances with a ten-
acre minimum lot size which were imposed on land in the Palo
Alto foothills. Plaintiff Eldridge sought relief in damages for in-
verse condemnation. Significantly, he conceded the validity of the
ordinances.20'
The ordinances in question had been enacted pursuant to the
Open Space Lands Act.202 The Eldridge court interpreted Govern-
ment Code section 65912, part of the Open Space Zoning Arti-
197. Id. at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
198. Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
199. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d
1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), aff'd, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978).
200. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
201. Id. at 628, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
202. CAT_ GoWT CODE §§ 65560-65564, 65566-65568, 65570 (West Supp. 1977).
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cle,203 to reveal that the California legislature recognized "that an
unreasonably drastic open-space zoning ordinance, although
otherwise valid, may result in a taking requiring 'just compensa-
tion therefor.' ,,204 On its face, however, the section seems to have
an altogether different significance:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that this article is not in-
tended, and shall not be construed, as authorizing the city or the county to
exercise its power to adopt, amend or repeal an open-space zoning ordi-
nance in a manner which will take or damage private property for public
use without the payment of just compensation therefor. This section is not
intended to increase or decrease the rights of any owner of property
under the Constitution of the State of California or of the United
States. 20 5
Clearly the Open Space Zoning Article does not authorize the
use of zoning ordinances amounting to a taking without compen-
sation. However, this is an .altogether different proposition from
authorizing the use of zoning ordinances amounting to a taking,
so long as these ordinances include compensation. If the Eldridge
court engaged in an autistic reading of section 65102, the reading
nevertheless would represent a creative solution to the problem.
So long as Eldridge is not overruled,206 open space zoning in Cal-
ifornia will become one of the rare examples of the use of com-
pensable regulations in the United States. 207
The Fldridge court clearly held that "a valid zoning ordinance
may nevertheless operate so oppressively as to amount to a tak-
ing, thus giving an aggrieved landowner a right to damages in in-
verse condemnation."208 Noticeably lacking from the decision,
however, is any discussion of how much compensation and what
kind of compensation the landowner is to receive. These ques-
tions were addressed recently by the New York Court of Appeals
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.209 The
solutions reached by this court are so far-reaching as to be revolu-
tionary.
The plaintiffs in Penn Central were the owners of Grand Cen-
tral Terminal and the lessee of the development rights over the
terminal. They sought a declaration that the landmark preserva-
tion provisions of the Administrative Code of the City of New
203. Id. §§ 65910-65912.
204. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 619, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
205. CAL. GOV'T CoDE § 65912 (West Supp. 1977).
206. See Comment, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction
in Land Use Law, 28 HAST=NGS L.J. 1569 (1977).
207. See Comment, Compensable Regulations: Outline of a New Land Use Plan-
ning Tool, 10 Wnm.mE rr L.J. 451 (1974).
208. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 621, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
209. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 325, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1272, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 915 (1977), affd, 98
S. Ct. 2646 (1978).
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York were unconstitutional.210 In 1967 the terminal was declared a
landmark by the Landmarks Preservation Commission.2n1 Plain-
tiffs desired to construct a large office building over the terminal,
but each of their several requests for approval were denied.212
The Penn Central court, while recognizing that "government may
not, by regulation, deprive a property owner of all reasonable re-
turn on his property,"21 3 determined that it had two questions to
resolve. First, was the government required to assure the land-
owner a return on that ingredient of the value of his property cre-
ated not by his own efforts, "but instead by the accumulated
indirect social and direct governmental investment in the physical
property, its functions, and its surroundings"?214 The court held
the government had no such obligation. It held it would be suffi-
cient, at least for the purposes of a landmark preservation statute,
for the landowner to receive a reasonable return on the "privately
created and privately managed ingredient."215 The second issue
was whether development rights, transferable to adjacent sites
under the city ordinance, could be considered in calculating the
return on the property when some of the transfer sites were
owned by plaintiffs. 216 The court held that they could.
The Penn Central court carefully distinguished the landmark
preservation case from a zoning case.217 However, the essence of
the distinction was that the government had greater regulatory
powers in zoning. The court reasoned that with zoning, the land-
owners "burdened by the restrictions also benefit, to some extent,
from the furtherance of a general community plan."218
The Penn Central decision is analogous to the Eldridge deci-
sion because both refuse to invalidate an oppressive police power
ordinance and both require the landowner be compensated in-
stead. Penn Central goes far beyond Eldridge, however, with its
210. Id. at 328, 366 N.E.2d at 1273, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
211. Id. at 329, 366 N.E.2d at 1273, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
212. Id. at 329-30, 366 N.E.2d at 1273-74, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17.
213. Id. at 325, 366 N.E.2d at 1272, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
214. Id. at 323, 366 N.E.2d at 1272-73, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
215. Id. at 324, 366 N.E.2d at 1273, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
216. See generally Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory
Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973); Costonis, The Chicago Planw Incentive Zoning and
the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972); Rose, A Propo.
sal for the Separation and Marketability of Development Rights as a Technique to
Preserve Open Space, 51 J. URB. L 461 (1974).
217. 42 N.Y.2d at 326-29, 366 N.E.2d at 1273-74, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17.
218. Id. at 329, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
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radical position on what property rights must be compensated
and the form that compensation may take. Although Penn
Central's distinction betwben the privately and socially created
ingredients of private property will surely be subject to much crit-
icism, 219 the court's manifestation of a willingness to depart from
traditional concepts of eminent domain-related compensation
when compensating in conjunction with a police power regulation
is to be welcomed.220
NEW LEGISLATION FOR THE URBAN RESERVE
The California legislature has recognized the importance of
"discouraging premature and unnecessary conversion of open-
space land to urban uses.., because it will discourage noncon-
tiguous development patterns which unnecessarily increase the
costs of community services to community residents."22l How-
ever, the open space provisions which were presumably intended
to implement this goal, among others, may be crippled for lack of
more specific authority.
New legislation should be enacted to ensure that non-agricul-
tural land suitable for little but subdivision development can be
included in the open space element of a general plan. To accom-
plish this result, the definition of open space land2 22 should in-
clude land which is being held in an urban reserve until some
future date when development is both desirable and feasible.
The definition of open space use of land in the Williamson
Act 22 3 should be amended to include specifically open space land
preserved as a means of guiding urban growth. The Open Space
219. See, e.g., Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central
Terminal Decision, 91 HARv. L. REv. 402 (1977).
220. For a discussion of compromise solutions to the problem of compensation
under the police power and the power of eminent domain, see Berger, The Accom-
modation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76
COLuM. L. REV. 799 (1976); Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation
Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUm. L.
REv. 1021 (1975).
221. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65560(4) (b) (West Supp. 1977).
222. Id.
223. "Open Space Use" is the use or maintenance of land in such a man-
ner as to preserve its natural characteristics, beauty, or openness for the
benefit and enjoyment of the public, to provide essential habitat for wild-
life, or for the solar evaporation of sea water in the course of salt produc-
tion for commercial purposes, if such land is within:(1) A scenic highway corridor, as defined in subdivision (i).
(2) A wildlife habitat area, as defined in subdivision(j).
3) A saltpond, as defined in subdivision(k)."
4) A managed wetland area, as defined in subdivision(l).
5) A submerged area, as defined in subdivision(m).
Id. § 51201(o).
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Subventions program 224 should be amended so that the state will
reimburse local governments for revenue lost because of the ac-
ceptance of open space easements.225
The Open Space Zoning Article226 should also be rewritten. Al-
though the Eldridge decision interprets section 65912 of this arti-
cle as authorizing compensable open space zoning regulations
and upholds this novel device, the decision has already been criti-
cized as a mistake.227 The section should be rewritten to author-
ize the use of compensable regulations with open space land.
Furthermore, the legislature should clearly announce what ingre-
dient of the property value merits compensation and how such
compensation is to be calculated with reference to long-term re-
strictions like those appropriate to an urban reserve. Considera-
tion should be given to the authorization of the use of
transferable development rights or of other forms of non-dollar
compensation to avoid undue financial strain on local govern-
ments.
The courts of California and New York have already taken dar-
ing steps toward defining a middle road between non-compensa-
ble regulation under the police power and just compensation
under the power of eminent domain. The legislature should act
soon to reclaim the field. The decisions, the calculations, and the
compromises of competing interests require careful investigation
and study. The legislature is best equipped to meet the challenge.
CONCLUSION
In his proposed growth management program for San Diego,
Professor Robert H. Freilich has gone "one tier beyond Ramapo"
in recommending the establishment of an urban reserve. He sug-
gests the use of open space zoning to restrict land in the reserve
from development until at least 1995. If these zoning ordinances
included partial compensation for the landowner, a "middle way"
could be established between non-compensable regulation under
the police power and just compensation under the power of emi-
nent domain. Recent court decisions reveal a judicial willingness
to accept this kind of new approach. However, the legislature
224. Id. §§ 16100-16101, 16140-16154.
225. Id. §§ 51050-51065, 51070-51073, 51075, 51080-51087, 51090-51097.
226. Id. §§ 65910-65912.
227. Comment, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction in
Land Use Law, 28 HASTINGS .. 1569, 1590 (1977).
1239
should revise some sections of the legislation relating to open
space to maximize the efficient use of open space zoning as a
means of guiding urban growth.
SANDRA L. McMAmAm
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